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UID:65395-1788433200-1788433200@globalbiodefense.com
SUMMARY:Opportunities for Strengthening and Updating Crisis Standards of Care
DESCRIPTION:When hospitals faced the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic\, many quietly adapted how they delivered care without ever formally declaring a crisis. Protocols designed to guide difficult decisions during mass casualty events were bypassed\, misunderstood\, or simply left to individual clinicians at the bedside. A new expert consultation examines what went wrong and what needs to change before the next large-scale emergency. \nThe National Academies of Sciences\, Engineering\, and Medicine will host a virtual public briefing on Thursday\, September 3\, 2026\, from 11:00 AM to 12:00 PM Eastern Time. The session will present and discuss findings from a recently released rapid expert consultation\, Updating Crisis Standards of Care: Examining Gaps and Opportunities\, produced in response to a request from the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR). \nCrisis standards of care refer to a systematic approach for adapting health care delivery when patient demand exceeds available resources. These frameworks\, first developed by the National Academies in 2009 and expanded in 2012\, were put to the test at scale for the first time during COVID-19. The findings of the new consultation are pointed: the ethical foundations underlying these frameworks held up\, but the operational side fell short in ways that carry direct implications for future emergency preparedness. \nAmong the consultation’s central findings is that the three steps expected to define a crisis response\, recognizing that a crisis exists\, formally activating a plan\, and implementing crisis-level strategies\, often did not occur in sequence. Hospitals adopted crisis-level approaches without issuing formal declarations. States largely left activation decisions to individual facilities. Frontline clinicians were frequently left to make high-stakes allocation decisions without institutional backing or clear legal protection. The result\, the report finds\, was lasting moral distress and burnout among health workers that outlasted the pandemic itself. \nThe consultation also identifies regional coordination as both a critical gap and a meaningful opportunity. States including Washington\, Minnesota\, and Arizona established Medical Operations Coordination Centers during the pandemic to manage patient transfers and balance load across hospitals. Evidence suggests these centers may have prevented a measurable share of excess deaths during surge periods. Yet many were shut down after the immediate crisis passed\, largely due to funding constraints and unresolved questions about long-term governance. \nThe briefing is relevant for health security professionals thinking beyond infectious disease. The consultation addresses how crisis standards of care frameworks must also account for mass casualty events such as nuclear accidents\, high-consequence infectious disease outbreaks requiring complex isolation and transport capacity\, and infrastructure failures such as cyberattacks that can cripple hospital pharmacy and diagnostic systems without any increase in patient volume. \nThe report points to several priorities for the field: clearer operational guidance\, stronger decision-support tools\, more robust regional coordination infrastructure\, and flexible frameworks for workforce mobility. These are investments the consultation argues should be made before the next emergency\, not in response to it. \nA related analysis of these findings\, covering the lessons from COVID-19 and the emerging gaps in health system preparedness\, is available in the Global Biodefense article Crisis Standards of Care: Lessons from COVID-19 and Emerging Gaps in Health System Preparedness. \nFor more information and to register\, please visit Opportunities for Strengthening and Updating Crisis Standards of Care Public Briefing. \n\nThis content was researched and sourced by Global Biodefense editors and reported with Claude AI assistance for drafting and editing.
URL:https://globalbiodefense.com/event/opportunities-for-strengthening-and-updating-crisis-standards-of-care-public-briefing/
LOCATION:
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20261012
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20261017
DTSTAMP:20260627T151449Z
CREATED:20260627T151320Z
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UID:63770-1791763200-1792195199@globalbiodefense.com
SUMMARY:Training Course on Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity
DESCRIPTION:As biotechnology advances at an unprecedented pace\, the dual-use dimensions of biological research have become a central concern for the international community. Ensuring that scientists\, laboratory professionals\, and policymakers are equipped to navigate the intersection of innovation\, biosafety\, and arms control is increasingly essential to global health security. \nTo address this need\, the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC ISU) will co-organize the 2026 BWC Training Course on “Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity\,” taking place 12–16 October 2026 in New Delhi\, India. The intensive five-day program is funded through voluntary contributions from Norway in support of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). \nThe training is designed to strengthen capacities in biosecurity\, biosafety\, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology. It takes an integrated\, interdisciplinary approach to managing biological threats at the intersection of humans\, animals\, plants\, and the environment. The curriculum addresses the governance\, technical\, and operational dimensions of preventing\, detecting\, and responding to biological threats\, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with Article X of the BWC. \nThe course is open to early- and mid-career scientists from countries included on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of ODA Recipients. Eligible applicants should hold a professional background in virology\, microbiology\, or a related biological science\, with demonstrated hands-on experience in molecular biology or pathogen diagnostics. Applicants must currently work in at least a BSL-2 laboratory or equivalent facility\, and have practical experience with PCR\, diagnostic equipment\, and related materials. A working knowledge of English is required. Female applicants are encouraged to apply. \nSelected participants will receive financial support for air travel and a daily subsistence allowance in accordance with United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules. Participants are responsible for arranging their own health and travel insurance. States Parties to the BWC are requested to inform the BWC ISU of their endorsed nominees by means of a note verbale. \nFor professionals working in biosecurity\, biological arms control\, or laboratory-based public health\, this course offers a rare opportunity to engage with the policy and technical dimensions of the BWC in a structured training environment. The program’s focus on dual-use biotechnology governance\, biological threat detection\, and responsible innovation makes it directly relevant to national and institutional capacity-building efforts across the life sciences. \nThe deadline for applications is 17 May 2026. Applicants must submit an online application and provide a letter of recommendation from their employer confirming institutional support and explaining how participation will benefit both the institution and national capacities. \nFor more information and to register\, please visit the ICGEB’s Training course on Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity website.
URL:https://globalbiodefense.com/event/training-course-on-biotechnology-innovation-and-biosecurity-icgeb/
LOCATION:New Delhi\, India
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20261103
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20261106
DTSTAMP:20260819T182005Z
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UID:63528-1793664000-1793923199@globalbiodefense.com
SUMMARY:INTERPOL Global Biosecurity Conference 2026
DESCRIPTION:As biological threats grow more complex — spanning non-state actors\, emerging biotechnologies\, and increasingly porous borders — the need for coordinated international action across law enforcement\, public health\, and scientific communities has never been more pressing. A major international conference next autumn will bring these communities together to confront that challenge directly. \nINTERPOL’s Bioterrorism Prevention Unit will host the 2nd INTERPOL Global Biosecurity Conference from 3–5 November 2026 at INTERPOL Headquarters in Lyon\, France. The three-day conference will convene law enforcement and partner agencies\, biosecurity experts\, and academics from multiple regions and professional backgrounds to examine the current biological threat landscape and advance practical\, actionable responses. \nThe conference is designed to serve as an international forum for dialogue across sectors — including health\, customs\, civil protection\, the scientific community\, policy-makers\, and the private sector — with a shared focus on strengthening biosecurity at the global level. Specific objectives include exploring current and emerging biological threats relevant to law enforcement\, sharing good practices in prevention\, preparedness\, and incident response\, and defining concrete actions to address recommendations developed during the conference. The event builds on the inaugural Global Biosecurity Conference held in 2024. \nFor professionals working at the intersection of public health security\, biosecurity\, and global health governance\, this conference offers a rare opportunity to engage directly with law enforcement perspectives on biological threats — an increasingly critical dimension of biosecurity that extends well beyond traditional public health frameworks. Sessions will address topics ranging from early-warning systems and border biosecurity to forensic investigation of biological incidents and the dual-use risks posed by emerging technologies such as synthetic biology and AI-driven protein design. \nHighlighted sessions of interest include: \n\nGlobal biological threat landscape — Mapping the evolving landscape of non-state actors seeking to acquire\, produce\, or use biological agents and toxins as weapons\, including analysis of operational methods\, technical capabilities\, and access to open-source knowledge\nIndicators and early-warning for biological threats — Showcasing integrated intelligence frameworks combining health\, customs\, laboratory\, cyber\, and human intelligence to enhance detection\, including tools for real-time data aggregation and proactive biosecurity response\nHealth and law enforcement coordination when responding to a biological incident — Examining inter-agency decision-making\, joint command structures\, and coordination mechanisms during suspected biological incidents\, including gaps and solutions for a One Health approach\nForensic examination of bio-contaminated evidence — Outlining procedures for safe evidence preservation and presenting innovative forensic techniques for identification\, attribution\, and source tracing of biological agents or toxins used in deliberate incidents\nBiosecurity at borders — Examining integrated border control systems combining customs\, veterinary\, public health\, and law enforcement functions to detect illicit biological flows\, and discussing challenges in identifying dual-use commodities related to biological weapons\nScience\, technology\, and innovation: emerging challenges and dual-use risks to biosecurity — Identifying high-risk dual-use technologies including gene editing\, synthetic biology\, and AI-driven protein design\, and proposing proactive risk mitigation strategies and responsible innovation frameworks\nScience\, technology\, and innovation: opportunities for law enforcement — Demonstrating how technologies such as portable sequencing\, AI-powered diagnostics\, and rapid biosensors are transforming field detection and situational awareness\, with case studies of technology-enabled investigations\nMoving forward legal\, policy\, and information-sharing enablers for biosecurity — Examining legal and policy frameworks that facilitate cross-sector and international cooperation\, and identifying practical challenges and good practices in information-sharing\, evidence exchange\, and mutual assistance in the biosecurity context\n\nFor more information\, please visit INTERPOL’s Global partnerships against bioterrorism website.
URL:https://globalbiodefense.com/event/interpol-global-biosecurity-conference-2026/
LOCATION:INTERPOL Headquarters\, Lyon\, France
CATEGORIES:Government Hosted
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