Fifty years after it entered into force, the Biological Weapons Convention remains one of the foundational pillars of international disarmament — but experts gathered at a landmark anniversary event made clear that the treaty faces mounting pressures from emerging technologies, geopolitical strain, and gaps in verification and enforcement.
On March 26, 2025, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Geneva Branch and the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), with financial support from the European Union, hosted a commemorative event marking the 50th anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention’s entry into force. The gathering drew diplomats, academics, civil society representatives, and young scientists to assess the treaty’s achievements, identify its vulnerabilities, and chart a course for its future.
A Landmark Treaty With Unfinished Business
The BWC, which opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force on March 26, 1975, was the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It established a sweeping global norm: that disease must never be weaponized. The first panel at the commemorative event situated the BWC within a longer arc of arms control history, including the 1925 Geneva Protocol — which marks its own centenary later this year — as a precursor that helped cement international taboos against biological and chemical weapons.
Speaking at the opening of the event, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, struck a cautionary tone. She emphasized that the threat of biological weapons has not been confined to history and stressed the need to strengthen international efforts and include diverse perspectives in advancing global biosafety and biosecurity. Her remarks underscored a key tension that ran throughout the day: the BWC’s symbolic and normative weight remains strong, but its technical architecture has struggled to keep pace with evolving threats.
Verification Gaps and the Challenge of Emerging Technologies
The Convention’s most significant structural weakness has long been the absence of a formal verification mechanism — a gap that negotiations have failed to close for decades. Ambassador Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer of Brazil, Chairperson of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC, addressed this directly, arguing that the treaty’s future effectiveness hinges on building stronger technical capabilities, establishing verification mechanisms, and fostering greater transparency among states parties.
The third panel brought that challenge into sharper relief, focusing on how emerging technologies (including advances in synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology) are expanding both the potential for biological threats and the complexity of governing them. Speakers including Dr. Jaime Yassif of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Mr. Peter Babigumira Ahabwe of Uganda’s Ministry of Health, and Dr. Sana Zakaria of RAND Global offered recommendations for strengthening international cooperation in the face of these risks.
Dr. Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London, who serves as NGO Coordinator for the BWC, called for continued diplomatic engagement, responsible scientific practice, and a renewed sense of moral responsibility to uphold the ban on biological weapons for future generations — a framing that resonated with the event’s broader intergenerational focus.
Bringing New Voices Into the Biosecurity Conversation
One of the event’s notable threads was the emphasis on engaging younger scientists and underrepresented voices in treaty processes. Ms. Musonda Mandona, Biosafety and Biosecurity Advisor at Zambia’s Ministry of Health, reflected on her experience as a Youth for Biosecurity Fellow, noting that early-career scientists bring fresh perspectives to how the Convention can be implemented and strengthened. Her contribution illustrated an important point: as the BWC enters its second half-century, its relevance will depend in part on whether a new generation of scientists understands and embraces its obligations.
The event concluded with closing remarks from Mr. Daniel Feakes, Chief of the BWC ISU, who noted the recent accession of three additional states to the Convention as evidence of its continued importance. He described the anniversary as a moment for optimism — biological weapons remain, and will continue to be, repugnant to the conscience of humanity.
A treaty that holds the line against deliberate biological threats directly reinforces pandemic preparedness, laboratory biosafety norms, and the global governance structures on which health security depends. Strengthening the BWC is a public health imperative.
Sources and further reading:
Commemorating 50 Years of the Biological Weapons Convention – United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)