The global spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), particularly the H5N1 strain, has accelerated in recent years, raising alarms across public health, agriculture, and biosecurity sectors. With infections detected in wild birds, poultry, dairy cattle, swine, and even humans, the potential for a new influenza pandemic is no longer hypothetical—it is imminent.
A recent perspective published in PNAS highlights three urgent measures that governments, researchers, and stakeholders can take to substantially lower the risk of spillover events and subsequent pandemics.
Strengthening Wildlife and Agricultural Sampling
Enhanced environmental and agricultural surveillance is essential to track the rapid evolution of HPAI viruses. The virus has been detected not only in poultry and cattle but also in a range of wild and peridomestic animals, underscoring its ecological adaptability. Sampling wastewater, wetlands, farm-adjacent wildlife, and even insects such as blowflies can help identify pathways of transmission.
High-throughput genomic sequencing, paired with real-time analysis, enables the detection of reassortment events—the mixing of avian and human influenza genes that could spark a pandemic. Surveillance agreements between farms, laboratories, and government agencies will be critical to improving data sharing while minimizing stigma for agricultural producers.
Mitigating Indoor Exposure with Engineering Controls
Respiratory pathogens, including influenza, spread efficiently indoors through infectious aerosols. The COVID-19 pandemic made clear how shared air environments can accelerate outbreaks. New engineering standards, such as ASHRAE Standard 241, establish minimum requirements for controlling infectious aerosols through filtration, ventilation, and inactivation technologies.
Adopting these standards more widely could reduce the risk of pandemic-scale spread while simultaneously lowering the burden of seasonal respiratory illnesses. Investment in advanced bioaerosol research—including real-time air monitoring systems—would further strengthen resilience against airborne threats.
Reinforcing Public Health Education and Countering Disinformation
Vaccination remains one of the most powerful tools for pandemic prevention, yet vaccine hesitancy and health disinformation threaten its effectiveness. The COVID-19 era demonstrated how deliberate disinformation campaigns—not just misinformation—can undermine trust in science and public health authorities.
Tailored communication strategies, grounded in community engagement and supported by artificial intelligence tools for monitoring disinformation, are necessary to counteract these threats. Public health education must evolve beyond information delivery to building trust and resilience against organized campaigns of scientific denial.
Why This Matters for Public Health Security
Preventing spillovers of avian influenza is not solely a scientific challenge—it is a matter of national security and public welfare. A pandemic on the scale of COVID-19, or worse, could result in millions of deaths, trillions in economic losses, and deep social disruption. Early investments in surveillance, engineering controls, and health communication are far more cost-effective than reacting to an outbreak after it has spread globally.
For the general public, these measures ensure safer food systems, cleaner air indoors, and trustworthy public health information. For nations, they preserve agricultural stability, economic security, and geopolitical resilience in the face of biological threats.
Next Steps in Preparedness
The threat of avian influenza spillovers is real, but it is not inevitable. Through a One Health approach that integrates environmental surveillance, engineering innovations, and robust public health communication, society can stay one step ahead of HPAI. The time to act is now—before spillovers transform into the next global pandemic.
Yeh, K.B., Bahnfleth, W.P., Bradford, E., et al. Three things we can do now to reduce the risk of avian influenza spillovers. PNAS Opinion, 30 July 2025.