A Shifting Risk Landscape
Advances in biotechnology and artificial intelligence are rapidly transforming the life sciences, accelerating discoveries and fueling the global bioeconomy. Yet, alongside profound benefits for medicine, agriculture, and industry, these developments also carry risks. As technologies mature and diffuse more widely, they may lower barriers for nonstate actors seeking to develop or misuse biological agents.
A newly released RAND research report, authored by Barbara Del Castello and Henry H. Willis, outlines a transparent, repeatable method to assess these risks. The study, published in August 2025, integrates expert elicitation with structured analysis to evaluate how the maturity and availability of disruptive technologies might alter the threat landscape for malicious biological agent development.
A Transparent, Repeatable Assessment Method
The RAND team’s framework draws on earlier work from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) and incorporates a “technology availability score” to measure when specific technologies reach maturity. This scoring system factors in scientific advancement, demand, regulatory barriers, funding, and public accessibility.
Three adversary scenarios were modeled:
- Genetic modification of an existing, accessible pathogen
- Resurrection of a previously existing or difficult-to-acquire pathogen
- Creation of a novel pathogen
By examining how technologies could enable these scenarios, the method highlights the ways in which maturation and diffusion might amplify adversary capabilities over the next decade.
Key Findings
Maturing technologies will increase risk
Experts concluded that several emerging technologies—such as CRISPR-Cas9, next-generation sequencing, and foundational AI models—are likely to be mature or nearly mature within the next decade, thereby lowering barriers for hostile actors.
Not all technologies advance equally
Some tools, such as cloud labs, automated science platforms, and benchtop DNA synthesizers, were not expected to fully mature in the same time frame, suggesting that risks are uneven across technologies.
Technology maturity does not act in isolation
The study emphasizes that no single technology uniquely drives risk. Instead, the convergence and combination of tools—particularly when coupled with growing accessibility—will shape biosecurity concerns.
Need for broader expert input
The authors note that their pilot application drew on a limited set of expert perspectives. Expanding the diversity of expertise, particularly from policy and industry, will be essential for refining the method and ensuring comprehensive assessments.
Implications for Biosecurity Policy
The method provides a structured way for analysts and policymakers to anticipate how emerging technologies might alter adversary capabilities. This foresight is critical for designing proportionate and proactive security measures, without unnecessarily restricting beneficial scientific research.
Importantly, the framework offers repeatability and transparency—qualities often lacking in assessments of dual-use risk. This makes it easier for governments, security analysts, and international organizations to compare findings, track changes over time, and prioritize technologies for oversight or investment in safeguards.
Why This Matters for Public Health Security
Although the technical challenges of producing a biological weapon remain significant, history shows that barriers can erode as knowledge and tools spread. By anticipating these shifts, societies can better protect themselves from low-probability but high-consequence events.
For the general public, this research underscores why investments in biosecurity are essential. A single biological attack—even if small in scale—could disrupt economies, overwhelm health systems, and undermine public trust. National governments therefore have a strong interest in tracking technological change, building resilience, and supporting international norms that reduce misuse while promoting innovation.
Looking Ahead
The authors encourage application of this method to a wider set of technologies and expert communities, noting that advances in AI, automation, and synthetic biology will continue to outpace traditional policy frameworks. By systematically mapping how these tools affect adversary capabilities, decision-makers can better allocate resources for prevention, preparedness, and rapid response.
As biotechnology and AI continue to reshape science and industry, so too will they reshape the biosecurity landscape. The framework presented in this report offers a practical tool for understanding these changes and guiding proactive action. In doing so, it could serve as a foundation for more coordinated national and international efforts to strengthen health security in the years ahead.
Barbara Del Castello and Henry H. Willis, Assessing the Impacts of Technology Maturity and Diffusion on Malicious Biological Agent Development Capabilities: Demonstrating a Transparent, Repeatable Assessment Method, RAND Corporation, August 11, 2025.