The Trump Administration’s recent executive order banning federally funded gain-of-function (GoF) research in “countries of concern” and placing sweeping restrictions on domestic pathogen research has been framed as a win for biosecurity. In reality, this politically motivated policy could dangerously hobble the very scientific tools needed to anticipate, understand, and prevent the next pandemic.
On May 5, 2025, former President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order halting all federal support for what the administration calls “dangerous gain-of-function research,” not only abroad but also within the United States. While couched in rhetoric about improving oversight and protecting Americans from “lab leaks” like the alleged COVID-19 origin, this decision reflects a deeper mistrust of science and a misguided understanding of the role of GoF research in global health security.
The Science Behind the Hype: What Gain-of-Function Really Means
Despite being treated as a sinister or fringe activity in political discourse, gain-of-function research is a foundational technique in modern biology. It involves modifying organisms—viruses, bacteria, even immune cells—to study their behavior, improve therapeutics, or enhance vaccine development. Far from being rogue experimentation, GoF work underpins much of our current biomedical progress. It enabled the development of CAR-T cancer therapies, informed the mass production of penicillin, and guided surveillance for viral threats like avian influenza.
In virology, GoF research helps scientists identify which mutations make viruses more transmissible or virulent. This isn’t done recklessly. Such studies occur in tightly controlled environments under stringent biosafety regulations. By simulating how viruses might evolve in nature, researchers can anticipate public health threats and develop vaccines or treatments before outbreaks spiral out of control.
As highlighted by The Conversation, nature continuously carries out its own “gain-of-function experiments” as viruses mutate and adapt to new hosts. Scientific gain-of-function research aims to anticipate and understand these evolutionary changes. Halting this research is like tearing down a bridge because it might someday collapse—ignoring the critical role it plays in getting us safely across dangerous terrain.
A Politicized Response to a Complex Challenge
The Trump administration’s ban is not simply about safety—it’s part of a broader pattern of anti-science policymaking and COVID-19 revisionism. The executive order hinges on the still-contested “lab leak” theory regarding the origin of SARS-CoV-2, despite the fact that multiple studies, including investigations by the World Health Organization and independent scientists, point more plausibly to zoonotic spillover from a wildlife market.
Nonetheless, President Trump and key allies have persistently used the lab leak theory as a political cudgel—targeting China, deflecting from domestic pandemic failures, and now justifying the suppression of critical research. By invoking “lab-related incidents” like the 1977 Russian flu and speculating about a Wuhan lab escape with no definitive proof, the administration prioritizes blame over bioscience.
While greater oversight is warranted—especially for research with pandemic potential—blanket bans on GoF research risk throwing out the scientific baby with the political bathwater. As Dr. Kristin Matthews from Rice University’s Baker Institute put it: “If we ban it, the next time another COVID virus comes through we won’t have the data to quickly find new treatments, screening and even preventative measures.”
Undermining Global Health Security
The executive order also asserts that cutting off funding will promote American “biotechnology dominance.” In reality, it may do the opposite. American leadership in biomedicine depends on open, collaborative research and robust funding of science. By prohibiting U.S. funding in foreign nations—including China, a global hub for emerging infectious diseases—the administration is severing vital lines of surveillance and cooperation.
Moreover, many of the most pressing biosecurity threats do not respect national borders. Influenza strains in Southeast Asia, coronaviruses in bats, and vector-borne diseases in tropical regions all require global research efforts. Crippling our ability to study these pathogens in context only makes the world less prepared, not more.
There’s also a domestic cost. The order imposes new constraints on U.S.-based research with pathogens and calls for a halt to certain studies until yet another policy overhaul is complete. That kind of uncertainty can stall vital work, delay drug development, and drive young scientists away from critical fields.
Crippling Critical Research on Emerging Threats
The executive order’s sweeping ban on federally funded gain-of-function research stands to jeopardize essential work being done by U.S. agencies and institutions on the frontlines of pandemic preparedness. Programs led by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and federally funded academic research centers play a central role in studying high-risk pathogens—including select agents like Ebola, Nipah virus, and highly pathogenic avian influenza strains.
Many of these programs rely on gain-of-function approaches to understand how emerging viruses could evolve to become more transmissible or virulent in humans. For example, NIAID-supported research has used GoF methods to identify key mutations in H5N1 avian influenza that could allow airborne transmission in mammals—critical knowledge for designing vaccines and early-warning surveillance systems. Similarly, studies on SARS-like coronaviruses at the University of North Carolina and the University of Wisconsin-Madison have provided invaluable insight into viral spillover potential and immune escape mechanisms, informing our response to threats like COVID-19 and SARS.
The new restrictions not only risk stalling current research but may also deter future investigations into dangerous pathogens, leaving the U.S. less prepared to respond to the next pandemic threat. Rather than strengthening biosecurity, the executive order risks dismantling the very research infrastructure that protects public health and national security.
A Call for Evidence-Based Policy
Public health professionals and biomedical researchers must speak out against policies that mischaracterize or undermine essential science. While biosafety must be taken seriously, it cannot become a pretext for political grandstanding. Gain-of-function research, when conducted responsibly, is not a threat—it is a cornerstone of pandemic preparedness and biomedical innovation.
As new infectious threats loom on the horizon, the U.S. must invest in science, not silence it.
SOURCES AND FURTHER READING:
- The White House: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Achieves Improved Safety and Security of Biological Research
- NPR: Trump restricts funding for ‘gain-of-function’ research — calling it dangerous
- New York Times: Trump Executive Order Restricts ‘Gain of Function’ Research on Pathogens
- The Hill: Trump signs orders on gain of function research, drug manufacturing
- American Society for Microbiology: Gain of Function Research Fact Sheet
- The Conversation: Gain-of-function research is more than just tweaking risky viruses
- RAND: The evolution of United States governance policies for research using pathogens with enhanced pandemic potential
- MSNBC: Trump just took a sledgehammer to our pandemic preparedness
- CIDRAP: New executive order targets certain pathogen research; states sue HHS over restructuring
- Science: Trump moves to tighten rules on risky research on viruses, bacteria, and toxins